Brief History of Airbag Technology

Airbags were first invented in the 1950s as a way to provide crash protection for automobile occupants. Beginning in the 1970s, American auto makers such as Ford and General Motors began experimenting with these systems by implementing them into a limited number of fleet vehicles. The field data that the manufactures collected from these experimental airbags demonstrated two important conclusions: first, airbags can be extremely effective in helping to prevent serious injuries or deaths in moderate to severe crashes. Second, the manufacturers also concluded that for certain occupants in certain positions, airbags themselves could pose significant health and safety risks. Thus, the manufacturers concluded as early as the 1970s that airbag systems should be designed to deploy only when the risk of inflation induced injuries is outweighed by the safety benefits in higher speed crashes.

Specifically, the industry recognized that there were three main classes of occupants who were “at risk” for inflation induced injuries: 1) children riding in front seats; 2) short statured women drivers (belted or unbelted); and 3) occupants who were “out of position” or close to the airbag at the time of deployment (belted or unbelted). All three classes of occupants were at risk for inflation induced injuries as a result of being close to the airbag at the moment of deployment. These risks were well documented. Most manufacturers even conducted biomechanical testing to verify these risks with not only instrumented crash test dummies but even with anestheticized pigs. These tests concluded that if an occupant is close to the airbag when it deploys he or she can experience severe chest, neck, or head injuries resulting in paraplegia, quadriplegia, or death.

Even with these early systems airbags have always been designed to act as a supplemental restraint system, to be used in conjunction with seat belts. All airbag systems are comprised of several components, including: 1) the airbag itself; 2) the airbag module that houses the airbag and inflators in the hub of the steering wheel (or in the dash area on the passenger side); 3) the sensor system; and 4) the diagnostic module that receives and interprets information from sensors and determines whether the airbag should deploy.

Airbags vary in sizes, in the way they are folded, in the inflation energy and force used to deploy the bag, in the type and configuration of the sensor system, and in the use of various design considerations and components which may affect airbag performance.

Airbags were not included in most production vehicles until the 1990s. Before that time manufacturers were reluctant to include airbags in production cars due to their cost and also due to the lack of market demand for airbags. Beginning in the late 1980s there was increasing government pressure on the auto industry to include airbags for cars sold in North America. Finally, after the government adopted a rule which required auto makers to implement “passive restraint systems” in all automobiles sold in North America, American auto makers began producing vehicles in the early 1990’s which came with airbag systems as standard equipment.

Generation I Airbags

The early production airbags in most vehicles were designed to deploy with a “must fire” and a “no fire” threshold, which were computed by the airbag system based on the speed of a particular crash. For example, all Ford vehicles produced throughout the 1990’s had a “no fire” threshold of eight miles per hour, and a “must fire” threshold of fourteen miles per hour. The airbag system was designed to interpret the severity of a crash in terms of an equivalent velocity of a frontal crash, and if that equivalent velocity was above the fourteen mile per hour threshold, the airbag was designed to fire. Below eight miles per hour the airbag was designed never to fire. In between eight and fourteen, or in what is called the “grey zone,” the airbags were designed so they may or may not fire in any given accident.

These early airbags were also designed to meet the requirements of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208. This Federal Standard required that the manufactures conduct frontal crash tests with instrumented crash test dummies up to and including 30 miles per hour into a fixed rigid barrier. Based upon injury criteria which measured head, chest and femur loads, the manufacturers had to verify that even with the dummy unbelted, the airbag would offer sufficient protection to prevent the dummy from experiencing loads exceeding the criteria.

Manufacturers claimed that in order to meet the requirements of the 208 Safety Standard, they were required to use relatively aggressive airbags that deployed with sufficient velocity to protect unbelted occupants in the 30 mile per hour crash. Moreover, manufacturers claimed that the state of the art technology in the 1990s did not allow them to mitigate any of the dangers that these aggressive airbags posed to at-risk occupants.

Early Notice of Problems

Once airbags were included in production vehicles the predictions about their performance was proven true. First, airbags saved thousands of lives. One recent study concluded that as many as 6,000 lives have been saved as a result of airbags. Second, however, predictions about inflation induced injuries and deaths were also proven true. Soon after production vehicles with airbags rolled out onto the streets “at risk” occupants began to die. The government, alarmed by the number of airbag induced fatalities that it investigated and verified, began pushing manufacturers to improve airbag technology to mitigate their dangers.

This pressure resulted in a public relations push in the mid-1990’s by both industry and the government to increase consumer awareness about airbag dangers for short-statured women and for children who may ride in the front seat. To some extent this effort resulted in an increased awareness and undoubtedly saved lives as a result of consumers placing children in back seats during the latter 1990s. Government pressure also resulted in some warning labels being attached to sun visors.

However, despite the availability of technology that would have reduced the risks to short women, children, and out of position occupants, the industry resisted changing their airbag systems until new vehicle models were rolled out in the early 2000s. As a result hundreds of serious injuries and fatalities were needlessly caused by Generation I airbags which could have otherwise been avoided.

Generation I Airbag Problems

Consumer advocates and attorneys have argued that there are several relatively simple technologies and design changes that could have been implemented to have drastically reduced the risks posed by Generation I systems. Without question however, all of these design changes or alternative designs would have marginally increased the cost per vehicle, by sometimes as little as $20 per vehicle.

The following is a brief description of some of the primary alternative designs consumer advocates claim could have been implemented and which would have prevented needless injuries and deaths.

Alternative One: Increase the Thresholds

Largely based upon biomechanical and statistical studies, advocates argue that below crash severities of 16 miles per hour or greater, airbags offer no safety benefit to occupants, even occupants who are unbelted. Studies suggest that except for “freak” accidents there is essentially a zero percent risk to occupants for fatal or life threatening injuries below 12 miles per hour. Accordingly, advocates argue that the design decision to deploy Generation I airbags below 16 or even 12 miles per hour is a defective design. Experts have testified in recent airbag litigation that some manufacturers adopted a “one-size fits all” threshold range for all vehicle platforms with Generation I airbags because it was cheaper than setting vehicle-specific thresholds. Automotive engineers have testified that the more prudent approach was to set thresholds based upon vehicle specific characteristics, and to only deploy airbags when there is a statistical risk of fatal or near-fatal injuries.

Alternative Two: Tighten the GreyZone

The “grey zone” is the “may fire” range between the designated “must fire” and “no fire” threshold settings established for a particular vehicle by the manufacturer. Experts have testified and consumer advocates have argued that many vehicles have a grey zone which is too large, or “sloppy.” Experts have testified that it is cheaper, faster, and easier to design a vehicle with specifications that allow for a larger grey zone. Experts have also testified that instead of the six or eight mile per hour grey zones that were designed into some airbag systems, a three or four mile per hour grey zone was possible and much better for occupant protection. Obviously, with a smaller grey zone, there would be fewer deployments and hence it is argued, fewer unnecessary inflation induced injuries and deaths.

Alternative Three: Dual Level Inflation

Throughout the early 1990s, dual level inflation was available as another alternative design which would have prevented some injuries and deaths in low speed crashes. This technology enabled the airbag system to discriminate between a low speed crash and a higher speed crash. For low speed crashes, the system would deploy the airbag with less force and aggression than with a higher speed crash, in which the airbag would be deployed with more force. Bud Mertz, a well recognized biomechanical expert who was with General Motors in the early 1990s, was an advocate of dual level inflation systems. Mertz has stated that dual level inflation systems could reduce inflation induced fatalities by as much as 90 percent. Despite the availability of such technology most manufacturers did not include this technology in their Generation I systems.

Alternative Four: Discriminating Sensors for Belted Drivers

Statistical and other studies have recognized that an airbag is not needed by a belted driver until at significantly higher speeds than that needed by an unbelted driver. If an airbag begins to provide a benefit for an unbelted driver at 16 miles per hour, experts have testified that a belted driver doesn’t need a bag until in excess of 20 miles per hour. Beginning in the late 1980s, both Mercedes and BMW adopted technology which considered the belted driver. Their systems, referred to as “dual level threshold” systems, used seat belt buckle sensors to tell the system whether the occupants were belted. If the occupant is belted the airbags are designed to deploy at significantly higher speeds than if the occupant is unbelted. Unfortunately, other than BMW and Mercedes, few if any other Generation I systems incorporated such technology.

Alternative Five: Airbag Tethers

Airbag tethers are “string-like” ties that attach to the airbag that limit the airbag’s intrusion into the occupant compartment. These devices also affect the force with which an airbag deploys. An untethered bag first expands horizontally toward the occupant and then retracts back toward the steering column as the bag fills up with gas. In contrast, a tether restrains a bag’s forward movement. A tethered bag inflates horizontally, vertically and laterally, resulting in less horizontal intrusion towards the occupant. The tether results in less force with which the airbag impacts the occupant. While some Generation I systems incorporated tethered airbags, many did not.

Other Alternatives

There are various other alternative designs which could have been implemented to improve airbag performance or to reduce the risk to occupants. These alternatives include “friendly” or padded interiors making airbags unnecessary at lower speeds; less “aggressive” airbags; use of better sensor systems to prevent unnecessary deployments; and improved restraint systems to reduce the “ride down” effect of an occupant moving closer to an airbag during a crash.

Defenses

There have been dozens of Generation I airbag cases which have gone to verdict over the last 10 years. The vast majority – Ford claims as many as 95 percent — have resulted in defense verdicts. The cases are expensive and complex. Moreover, the manufacturers have a “head start” due to the jurors’ belief that airbags are good, soft, pillowy devices that save thousands of lives. Furthermore, the manufacturers have several proven defenses which they employ. Some of their favorite themes are as follows.

First, because most production Generation I airbag systems were similar in many aspects, the manufacturers argue that their system was “state of the art.” They argue that their system was virtually identical to other “competitor” (specifically, not BMW or Mercedes) systems on the market. This is probably one of their most effective defenses.

Second, manufacturers argue that the alternative designs posed were not technologically feasible in the 1990s. They argue that although such technology was on the drawing board, it was not possible to implement such technology in production vehicles until Generation II systems were rolled out in the early 2000s.

Third, they blame the consumer. Regardless of the facts of the case, the defense will invariably contend that the occupant was to blame for sitting too close, not wearing their seat belt, or some other similar claim.

Fourth, the manufacturers will try to use government data to suggest that airbag induced injuries and deaths are extremely rare. They will try to use the data to argue that their threshold – wherever it was for the particular vehicle – was justified by statistics.

Finally, the manufacturers will argue that airbag technology is “miraculous” and extraordinarily complicated. They will muddy the case by infusing confusing technological terms through automotive engineers who will sound very good and very knowledgeable to the jury.

Suggestions for Trial

Above all, try to keep the case simple. It will be absolutely necessary to master the science, literature and engineering principles behind airbag technology as well as the changing history of the federal regulations over this technology. However, after getting through that learning curve, the ultimate goal should be to try a simple case. The practitioner must convince the jury that airbags are extremely dangerous, and that extraordinary care should have been taken during the design process to use them only when necessary and with all due care that was technologically possible.

In Semidey v. Ford, an airbag case which concluded in early November, 2003 in Ft.Lauderdale, the plaintiffs’ attorneys conducted a live deployment of an exemplar vehicle’s airbag. This demonstration showed the jury what most people don’t comprehend – that airbags are extremely violent. When detonated the airbag sounded like a bomb exploding, shattering the windshield and popping the trunk. The jury was visibly shocked by the demonstration. After that the jury was much more able to understand the need for the alternative designs that the plaintiffs presented by other experts during the days following the demonstration.

Conclusion

Generation I airbags save lives. However, many Generation I airbags had significant design shortcomings that needlessly put women, children and belted occupants at risk. Millions of Generation I airbag equipped vehicles are on the road and will be for the next decade. While difficult cases, consumer lawyers should not be shy about challenging the design decisions regarding these airbag systems on behalf of the seriously injured client.